Election results: the challenges they pose

A.B. Shahid

At long last, elections were held on February 18. Chairman EC and caretaker Prime Minster lost no time in claiming credit for organizing 'free, fair, transparent and peaceful' election, and party leaders, particularly those who had all along cried foul, expressed their satisfaction with its results (because they met their 'expectations'). This chorus, not so much public opinion, is supposed to qualify the elections as credible.
What made the elections credible (at least for appearance sake) was in fact the pressure mounted by a relentless battle waged by lawyers, APDM, the media and the unsung millions from the civil society but one man, who ensured peace and order during the elections (and hugely reduced the chances of poll-rigging), but took no credit there for is the new CoAS although he and his soldiers had a major share in it.
Events of December 27 had painted such frightening scenarios of post-election violence that killing of 29 and injuries to another 200 individuals in 32 cities and towns and the reported inconsistencies in the electoral rolls were accepted as the affordable cost of elections. Not just the jubilant political parties but foreign observers monitoring the elections too thought it a fair bargain but to seem credible, did express minor doubts over the transparency of the process.
An interesting aspect of media coverage of the elections was the near complete blackout of the level of voter turnout. Although EC's result announcement of each constituency included the number of registered voters and votes actually cast, no newspaper or TV channel reported the percentage of voter turnout because it could mar the 'transparency' of the electoral process. Why they did so under a seemingly agreed strategy is a question awaiting an answer.
By burying all our doubts for the moment we are to believe that the ritual to install a 'democratic' regime is over, and the 'majority' elected all the parliamentarians. The fact that parties doubting the transparency of the electoral process and threatening a violent reaction if results did not meet their expectations won huge numbers of seats to influence a future dispensation if not run it, is expected to reinforce a belief in the transparency of the elections.
So much for the legislators elected by the majority! Now begins the squabbling over who grabs power in the new regime. But much before that, the elected representatives must decide to which 'constitution' should they pledge their loyalty. Should it be the pre-November 3 version of it or should it be the constitution amended by Mr. Musharraf on November 3? For the benefit of the establishment, the two main winners - PPP and PML-N - differ on this vital issue.
The powers that be want the incoming administration to retain Mr. Musharraf in the top slot because, in spite of all that he did in recent months, he remains their ideal soldier for fighting their 'war on terror', and his unceremonious exit from power will hurt the sentiments of Pakistan's armed forces. This 'fact of life' was explained in depth to late Ms. Benazir, and now guides PPP's strategy-making group although abiding by it may eventually cost PPP pretty heavily.
Not surprisingly therefore, in spite of all its claims to being virtually the product of democracy (never mind how it elects its chairpersons), the PPP is softly downgrading the importance of the version of the constitution it pledges its loyalty to. The stand has its merit; visibly, it ensures a quick transition of power to the elected representatives to begin the urgent task of alleviating the sufferings of the electorate and putting the economy back on track.
But what is as visible to the onlookers is the fact that it also strengthens the prospects of forming PPP-dominated governments in the centre and the provinces. More importantly, for the party co-Chairperson it ensures continuance of the NRO. This odd combination of advantages raises doubts about PPP's visible sincerity, urgency and concern for fixing the economy, and distorts the image of the priorities it has been emphasizing in its election campaign.
Why does the PPP want to postpone examination of the validity of November 3 amendments to the constitution? Isn't that a strange beginning for a sovereign parliament? The move doesn't strengthen the democratic credentials of the PPP. Surely, the party's executive committee needs to re-consider its stand on this crucial issue since on November 2 the then SC bench had disallowed any amendments to the constitution without parliamentary sanction.
The other issue on which PPP needs to re-think it strategy is the restoration of the sacked judiciary. This was a highly questionable executive act and did not go down well even with regimes in Pakistan-friendly countries, much less with the foreign media. Even the US senators visiting Pakistan as election observers have been critical of the move. All these critics can't possibly be wrong and, most certainly, they are not.
How on earth can democracy (and the liberties it guarantees) take roots in a country wherein the entire top judiciary can be sent packing by an executive order and the parliament doesn't take note thereof? By condoning this act, will we boost the confidence of Pakistanis in the judicial system or encourage investors to come and invest in Pakistan? PPP must recognize that it faces a mammoth economic rehabilitation task and it can't afford to commit such blunders.
The reported government move to urge a Swiss court to prosecute PPP co-Chairperson in the long running case about kick-backs, is a warning that the protection afforded by the NRO could be withdrawn if PPP doesn't listen and join hands with parties (that have doubtful track records) to isolate PML-N. But even PPP's loyalists will disapprove of such an alignment since the move will effectively render PML-N a manageable target for the establishment and thus sustain the chaos that is eating away at the very roots of the country.
The electorate is no longer as disinterested as it was in 1988 and 1995, and had the fear of violence not kept it away, the election results could have been different. PPP's success owes a great deal to this distortion. God alone knows who was behind the violence after December 27; it ensured a low voter turn out on the polling day and prevented any party from getting a clear majority to form a government either at the centre or in the provinces. What is now obvious is that it will help the establishment out-manoeuvre a future regime.
PPP must not lose sight of its weaknesses in this respect as well as the fact that, unrestrained by fear of violence, the electorate could react massively but non-violently, as it did after March 9 last year to force a PPP government to withdraw, as did Mr. Musharraf. For doing what he did from November 3 onward, PPP simply doesn't have the clout. In any case, the impact of Mr. Musharraf's show of power is disappearing faster than he thought.
After the King's party's pathetic showing at the polls, its leaders are disapproving of Mr. Musharraf's post-March 9 actions. Sadly, none did so when they could i.e. use the then sitting parliament to stop him. A lurking danger is that, like PML-Q, the elected PPP parliamentarians who benefited from the distortion caused by low voter turn out, may feel too weak to stop the high command from acting unwisely, a tragedy that befell PPP more than once in the past.