CoD: MMA in the driving seat?

Zahid U Kramet

 

Persisting with their single point agenda of removing General Pervez Musharrf from the presidency, the signatories to the Charter of Democracy (CoD) ratified an agreement for the early return to democracy in London on Sunday July 2, 2006. There was little to the affair other than the issue of an ultimatum to President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to relinquish charge by July 31, or ready to face a vote of no-confidence, to be followed by an anti-government drive beginning August 1. Still, the chapter of the charter had every English language daily perched on the very edge of their seats in heady anticipation, as it made the front-page headlines of nearly each one of them, the letdown of the seven resolutions reportedly passed at the London meet notwithstanding.
According to one report filed, the first and the foremost of these resolutions had everything to do with the exoneration of the two former prime ministers (and incidentally other Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy leaders) from alleged crimes, demanding the withdrawal of all cases against them. The second resolution concerned the alarming law and order situation and brought into examination the deteriorating relations between the centre and the provinces, with the questionable implication that both these issues were much better handled during the tenures of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharrif. The third resolution addressed the topic of the privileged few benefiting from government policies, suggesting that this had not been the case during the tenure of the PPP or the PML-N. Factored in somehow was also the construction of the new General Headquarters (GHQ) project about which there has been considerable furor but no decision either way. The fourth resolution called into question the government's privatization procedures, while the fifth demanded the immediate return of the army to its barracks. The sixth resolution commiserated with the families of the Nishtar Park tragedy and the seventh denounced the attack on some Christian youth in Islamabad by a security agency. Another report has it that there was a resolution condemning the use of force in Balochistan and Waziristan, but it mostly dwelt on the holding of free and fair elections under an independent election commission subsequent, of course, to the removal of the incumbent government.
Considering that the CoD was to be the stuff dreams were made of for those committed to the democratic process, the way it was put was not exactly enthralling. The rhetoric which followed in the wake of the charter being signed was even less so. Ms Bhutto, for instance, appealed to the international community, particularly the US, to help restore democracy in Pakistan -- as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan? This clearly implies there would be no change in the policy of combating terrorism. She did not highlight however, how and with whose help she is to accomplish that mission. Perhaps she is banking on the army minus Musharraf. Then where is the army's return to the barracks? Almost in the same breath Ms Bhutto took up the cudgels against corruption citing the Supreme Court's verdict on the Pakistan Steel Mills case as a clear indictment of the military regime (never the military!). But again, although not in so many words, she made the point that she was not averse to the privatization process, but only of units that were running at a loss. This implies there is to be no change in the economic policy should she be returned to power, which leads to the next question. Where, for instance, does she stand on the global trade accord espoused by the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the Doha Round Talks having made no progress due to the obduracy of the west on matter of agricultural subsidies? Do Ms Bhutto and the PPP have a plan to swing such a deal with the WTO and the donor agencies which might so inspire the masses into a demonstration of street power as to topple the incumbent government?
The Sharrifs may have had a plan -- both economic and ideological. The product of a sensitive agency and the army, they were discarded for their suddenly erupted delusions of grandeur. But they do have a following in business circles -- and an awful lot of money. Of themselves, their PML-N may no be able to turn the tide in their favour, but together with the religious right and their own earlier ideological moorings they well could have - if only for a short period of time. The Mutthida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) has the same bone of contention with the ARD as it had with the Musharraf regime: that neither grouping has taken religion into owed cognizance. And the MMA does have street power, albeit not an economic profile. This is where the Shariffs could kick in and forge an alliance. But for the Sharrifs to regain power through such means, it would require of them to pursue an entirely independent economic policy, to which the world no longer subscribes. Moreover with Pakistan already precariously placed on the Taliban issue, any street movement designed to define religious boundaries would likely to fizzle out as quickly as it begins. And the Sharrifs are nothing if not street-smart, so they have elected to go the way of the ARD and the PPP. The MMA too is desperately groping to remain in the corridors of power without causing offence to its constituency -- and it has options. It could backtrack to Musharraf if a solution to Waziristan is found. Or it move closer in the direction of the ARD, if the alliance accommodates its views. In short, it appears as if the MMA is in the driving seat.
Musharraf too has options. He has availed some of them by receiving commitments of serious investments from China and he has mended fences with Russia by way of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to broker a deal for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline, which could extend further into India and onwards to China. He received a temporary setback on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline with Iran holding back on the prices offered, but the deal will probably be clinched shortly, as all stand to benefit. The Gwadur port project is well on its way to fruition and in view of the Musharaf government's vision of making Pakistan a trade and energy corridor for the region, important Gulf sheikhdoms have expressed interest in investing in this country. India, poses a problem on the issue of water from Kashmir, but it is not an insurmountable one given India's future energy requirements. However for peace and progress to win through, it does require an accommodating mindset on the part of the governments of both countries, which will only come from the rejection of the colonial psyche that each is prey to in its respective establishment circles.
For Pakistan, particularly in the Punjab and somewhat in the NWFP, the spillover of this is manifested in the military's arrogant deportment. The end result is reflected by the inability of the Centre to come to grips with paradigm of autonomy and decentralization, which has lead to the mushroom growth of organizations like the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) that has had a negative bearing on the smaller provinces, and beyond that, piloted resistance movements such as to be in found in Balochistan today, the East Pakistan of yesteryear, and the Sindh of tomorrow. These are not glad tidings and the insecurity and instability that the country confronts at this time is the direct outcome of this dated colonial attitude. Presumably the ARD aims to address this imbalance, but if so the CoD should have spelt out the issues in greater detail for it to have merited the type of public response it sought. As it is, the charter is viewed as barely touching the surface of the need, while the signatories fall well short of expectations.